INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND FIRM’S DIVIDEND POLICY by Ni, Jinlan
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Economics Faculty Publications Department of Economics
Winter 2008
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND FIRM’S
DIVIDEND POLICY
Jinlan Ni
University of Nebraska at Omaha, jni@unomaha.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/econrealestatefacpub
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department
of Economics at DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
How to cite this paper: Guo, W., Ni, J. (2008). Institutional ownership and firm’s dividend policy. Corporate Ownership & Control,
5(2), 128-136. http://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i2p10
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 5, Issue 2, Winter 2008  
 
 
128
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND FIRM’S DIVIDEND POLICY 
 
Weiyu Guo*, Jinlan Ni** 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the linkage between dividend policy and institutional ownership within the 
context of the dividend model of Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000). Specifically, it provides an 
empirical test of Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000)’s novel implication that a tax differential between 
institutions and retail investors effects dividend policies. Using merge data of US industrial firms from 
1980-2002, our results indicate that the dividend paying decision is positively related with institutional 
ownership. That is, firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to be dividend payers. 
Further, we find that the deferred tax or tax credits that the institutional investors own significantly 
contribute to the dividend initiation decision as well as the level of dividend payments.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) suggested that in a 
frictionless world without taxes or transaction costs, 
dividends and share repurchases are equivalent 
policies. Thus a company’s dividend policy is 
irrelevant to the value of the firm. When dividends are 
taxed more heavily than stock subject to capital gains 
rates, which had been the case under the IRS tax code 
until the 2003 tax reform act, then share repurchases 
would appear to be superior to dividends. We would 
therefore anticipate more share repurchases than 
dividends due to the tax differential. The actual data 
indicate, however, that there is a significant 
proportion of dividend payers and a larger percentage 
of dividend paying firms than firms making share 
repurchases. This is called the dividend puzzle.  
There is a growing body of literature attempting 
to explain the dividend puzzle. One explanation 
relates to the 1974 Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA). ERISA subjected private 
pension fund managers to the prudent man rule. The 
application of the prudent man rule led to investment 
policy and institutional charter restrictions that require 
institutions to favor dividend paying stocks, especially 
those with high dividend yields. Brav and Heaton 
(1998) documented that many institutional investors 
abandoned dividend-omitting firms after the prudent 
man rule was required. And when firms reinitiated 
dividends, the effect reversed.  
Tax-exempt institutions also favor higher 
dividend yields because of their higher pretax 
expected returns. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
recognized that dividends can be a mechanism to 
compensate institutional investors. Michaely, Thaler, 
and Womack (1995) examined volume changes 
around dividend changes as indicators of clientele 
rearrangements.25 Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Trezevant 
(1998) found that the initiation of dividend payments 
led to an increase in institutional ownership. 
Specifically, they found that tax-exempt/tax-deferred 
and corporate investors increased their ownership in 
firms that initiated cash dividends as these investors 
purchased shares sold by individual investors for 
whom dividends were tax-disadvantaged. These 
studies provided evidence that institutional ownership 
and firm dividend policy are related and led to 
increased interest in further examining the direct 
linkage between dividend policy and institutional 
ownership. 
More recently, Allen, Bernardo and Welch 
(2000) examined how a tax differential between 
individual investors and institutional investors would 
impact a firm’s dividend policy.  They predicted that 
when institutional investors are relatively less taxed 
than individual investors, dividends induce 
“ownership clientele” effects. Their prediction is 
                                               
25
 For a rather comprehensive review of some earlier work 
regarding dividend policy and institutional ownership, 
please refer to Allen and Michaely (1995). 
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based on two assumptions.  First, investors are taxed 
differently and invest rationally, so dividends can 
induce specific clientele changes. Second, the 
presence of institutional clientele can increase the 
value of the firm. Consequently, firms paying 
dividends attract relatively more institutions, and 
institutions have a relative advantage in detecting high 
quality firms and in ensuring that firms are well 
managed. The Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) 
model found that by titling their portfolios in favor of 
dividend-paying stocks, tax-exempt institutions gain 
higher rates of return even though they may incur a 
loss of some diversification benefits and an increase 
in monitoring costs.  
Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) examined the 
role of institutional ownership in relation to dividend 
payout ratios within the context of the dividend 
models of Lintner (1956), Waud (1966), and Fama 
and Babiak (1968) using a United Kingdom (UK) 
panel data set. Using dummy variables for ownership 
data, they found positive association between a 
dividend payout policy and institutional ownership. 
Tax effects, however, were not directly tested and the 
institutional framework and ownership structures in 
UK are quite different from those of the US. 
 Baker and Wurgler (2003) proposed a catering 
theory of dividends. They argued that the decision to 
pay dividends is driven by prevailing investor demand 
for dividend payers. Their theory implies a close link 
between fluctuations in the propensity to pay 
dividends and catering incentives. Relying on 
regressions of future excess returns of dividend-
payers and non-dividend-payers on the changes in the 
propensity to pay dividends, their empirical work 
explained the post-1977 disappearance of dividends as 
well as earlier appearances and disappearances. Baker 
and Wurgler (2003), however, did not specify for 
whom the firms are catering.  
This paper provides an empirical test of Allen, 
Bernardo and Welch (2000)’s implication that a tax 
differential between institutions and retail investors 
effects dividend policies. When institutional 
investors’ deferred taxes & investment tax credits 
increase, we anticipate that they have increased 
demand for dividend payments because deferred taxes 
and investment credits can offset dividend payments 
for tax purposes. Hence we predict that institutional 
investors’ deferred taxes & investment tax credits are 
positively correlated with the probability of a firm 
being a dividend payer as well as the level of dividend 
payment. Using dividend data from the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database and 
institutional ownership data from the Thomson 
Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 13f Institutional 
Holdings from 1980-2002, excluding financial and 
utility firms, we first examine the linkage between 
dividend policy and institutional ownership using a 
logit regression, then examine the relationship 
between the level of dividend payment and 
institutional ownership deferred tax or investment tax 
credit using cross-section time series data. Our results 
are consistent with our hypotheses.   
Our paper contributes to the literature by 
empirically testing how institutional ownership and 
institutional deferred taxes and investment tax credits 
effect firm dividend policies. While Dhaliwal, 
Erickson, and Trezevant (1998) provided evidence 
that the effects of tax clienteles for dividend policies 
are strong enough to influence the decisions of 
investors, our paper provides evidence from a 
different perspective – that is, higher institutional 
ownership and larger institutional deferred taxes and 
tax credits induce higher dividend payments. Our 
paper also sheds light on the question - for whom are 
firms catering their dividends. This question was left 
an unanswered in Baker and Wurgler (2003). The 
theory provided by Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) 
behind our empirical work further allows us to 
improve on Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) by using 
actual ownership data instead of dummy variables to 
examine the direct linkage between the change of 
dividend payment and institutional ownership. The 
use of ownership dummy variables in Short, Zhang 
and Keasey (2002) made it difficult to characterize 
different dividend payments across firms with 
institutional ownership. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 describes the sample and variables. Section 
3 presents the hypotheses and methodology. Section 4 
reports the results. Section 5 summarizes the paper. 
  
2. Sample, Variables and Time Trends 
2.1 Sample and variables 
 
Data are from two sources - the CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
merged database and the Thomson Financial 
CDA/Spectrum S34 13f Institutional Holdings. 
Sample period is 1980-2002. From the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged data, we extract 
dividends per share (Item DATA26 in the database), 
stock price per share (DATA199), common shares 
outstanding (DATA25), Deferred Tax & Invest Tax 
Credit (DATA35), Deferred Taxes at income account 
(DATA50), Investment Tax Credit at income account 
(DATA51) and Deferred Taxes at balance sheet 
(DATA74). We further extract equity in the Balance 
Sheet and use it as a proxy for book value per share to 
calculate the book value / market value (BV/MV) 
ratio for subsequent regression analysis. Following 
Fama and French (2000), a firm must have market 
equity data at year t to be in the sample for the year. 
Both utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4949) and 
financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded. 
These industries may have regulatory requirements 
for high dividend payouts which are independent of 
any benefits of attracting institutions.  
From the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 
13f Institutional Holdings database we extract the 
number of shares held by managers at the end of each 
of quarter (variable SHARES at 13f database). Since 
13f data are aggregated to a manager level, we then 
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calculate institutional holdings by totaling all manager 
level holdings based on manager number (MGRNO) 
for each quarter. Given that the CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
data are annual data while the 13f are quarterly data, 
we retain number of shares as of the last quarter as 
institutional holding in a particular year. We also 
further extract industry code (Industry) for subsequent 
regression analysis. The variables from the two 
datasets are then merged through an 8 digit CUSIP of 
the stock and YEAR in consideration. After the data 
are merged, we calculate institutional ownership in 
percentage terms (INST) by dividing institutional 
holdings by the total common shares outstanding. If a 
ratio is outside of the range of 0-1, the observation is 
treated as an outlier and is deleted.   
Similar to Fama and French (2000), we then 
classify sample firms into two categories – those who 
pay dividends (Payer) and those who do not pay 
dividend (Non-payer). In the Payer group, those 
newly listed firms that are dividend payers are further 
recognized as Newpayer. The Non-payers are also 
further separated into 1) those having never paid 
(Neverpaid); and 2) those formerly paying but then 
having stopped paying (Formerpayer).  Following 
Fama and French (2001), these are the "firms that do 
not pay in year t but did pay in a previous year”.  
Table 1 gives the summary statistics of the key 
variables. It shows that 47% of the observations in the 
sample are Payers (3% of which are Newpayers) and 
53% are Non-payers (8% Former-payers and 45% 
Neverpaids). Note the summation of Payer and Non-
payer equals one. Table 1 also shows that the mean 
dividend per share in our sample is $0.35 on an 
annual basis with a standard deviation of 0.89 and the 
mean annual institutional ownership is 27% with a 
standard deviation of 0.24. Mean market capital of the 
sample firms is about $1,576 million and mean book 
to market value ratio is 0.51. The table further reports 
the means and standard deviations of the deferred tax 
and investment tax credit measures. Mean 
institutional Deferred Tax and Investment Tax Credit 
and Deferred Taxes at Balance Sheet are $62.41 and 
$62.95 respectively, with standard deviations of 
412.09 and 411.09. The means of Deferred Tax at 
Income Account and Investment Tax Credit at Income 
Account are $1.47 and $1.52 respectively and the 
standard deviations are 88.93 and 15.45.   Note the 
numbers of Deferred Tax & Invest Tax Credit and 
Deferred Taxes at Balance Sheet are similar, because 
both measures represent the accumulated tax deferrals 
due to timing differences between the reporting of 
revenues and expenses for financial statements and 
tax purposes with small differences in the items being 
excluded in the calculations26. Similarly, Deferred 
Tax at Income Account and Investment Tax Credit at 
Income Account both represent the amortized portion 
of tax savings that reduces the current year's tax 
liability.  
                                               
26
 Please refer to CRSP manual for details of how the items 
are defined.   
Table 1 about here 
 
2.2 Time trend in dividends and 
institutional ownership 
 
Figure 1A shows the percentage of dividend paying 
firms vs. non-dividend paying firms over time. The 
proportion of Payers declines consistently throughout 
sample period from about 60% in 1980 to just slightly 
over 30% in 2002. This observation is consistent with 
the patterns documented in Fama and French (2001). 
Conversely, the proportion of non-dividend paying 
firms has been increasing concavely from about 40% 
in 1980 to close to 70% in 2002.  
Figure 1B shows the percentage of newly listed 
firms that are dividend payers from 1980-2002. In 
1980, the percentage of newly listed firms that are 
dividend payers was as high as 60%. Over the years, 
the percentage declined significantly to as low as 
under 10% from 1995-1997 before increasing to over 
40% in 2001. In 2002, the percentage declined to 
under 30%. Figure 1C shows the percentage of firms 
that having never paid dividends vs. those former 
dividend payers. Among the non-dividend paying 
firms, the percentages of Formerpayers are much 
lower than those of the Neverpaids over the years.  In 
fact, the percentage of former payers shows a 
declining trend. The percentage declined from slightly 
under 30% in the early 80s to below 10% in 2002, 
indicating a trend of fewer firms terminating dividend 
payments over time.    
 
Figure 1A, 1B, and 1C about here 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the amounts of dividends 
being paid on a yearly basis compared with mean 
annual level of institutional ownerships throughout 
the sample period. Institutional ownership has 
increased steadily from slightly less than 20% to just 
below 35% from 1980 to 2002. Consistent with the 
literature, average annual dividends also demonstrate 
a steadily increasing pattern. It increased from under 
$0.15 per share in 1980 to over $0.35 per share in 
2002. While we observe that average annual dividend 
amount are increasing, recall that Figure 1A shows 
the percentage of firms that are dividend payers is 
declining. A possible explanation for these observed 
patterns is even though the number of firms paying 
dividends has been decreasing, dividend paying firms 
increase the dividend amounts as institutional 
ownership increases.   
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
3. Hypotheses, Methodology, and Results 
3.1  Hypotheses 
 
Our testable hypotheses are based on Allen, Bernardo 
and Welch (2000) that institutional ownership affects 
the firm’s dividend policy. We expect that: 
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(1). Dividend Payers are more likely to associate 
with institutional investors than Non-payers. 
Assuming investors are taxed differently and invest 
rationally, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) 
predicted that there is an “ownership clientele” effect. 
Consequently, firms paying dividends attract 
relatively more institutional investors. 
 (2). Dividend Payers with institutional ownership 
are more likely continue to be future payers than Non-
payers.  This hypothesis is based on the smoothing 
effect discussed in Allen, Bernardo, and Welch 
(2000). Firms that pay dividends try not to reduce the 
amount of the dividend, because their clientele 
(institutions) are precisely the kind of investors that 
will punish them for it. Thus dividend paying firms 
will try to keep dividends relatively smooth.  
(3). Dividend Payers are more likely to associate 
with large deferred taxes and investment credits than 
Non-payers. When institutional investors have 
deferred taxes & investment tax credits, they favor 
dividends because dividends can offset the deferred 
taxes and investment credits for tax purposes. Hence 
we see dividend Payers are more likely to associate 
with deferred taxes and investment credits than Non-
payers.  
(4). Dividend amount is positively related with 
institutional ownership. Due to institutional investors’ 
demand for dividend payments, we expect to see that 
firms with higher institutional ownership are related 
to higher dividend payouts.  
(5). Dividend amount is positively correlated with 
the level of institutional investors’ deferred taxes & 
investment tax credits. Given dividends can induce 
clientele changes, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) 
predict that tax differences between institutions and 
retail investors are significant determinants of 
dividend payments. Hence we predict that higher 
institutional investors’ deferred taxes & investment 
tax credits are associated with higher dividend 
amounts.  
Logit and time-series cross sectional regressions 
are applied to test the hypotheses. Model 
specifications and regressions results are presented in 
the following subsections.  
 
3.2  Methodology  
3.2.1 Logit  regression models 
Before we begin our regression analysis, we examine 
the correlations between the independent variables 
and future regression dependent variable Dividend per 
Share. The numbers are reported in Table 2 showing 
positive correlations. Further, note that the 
correlations among the different tax credit measures, 
such as Deferred tax and Investment Tax Credit and 
Deferred Taxes at Balance Sheet, are high (0.9967), 
we hence use one tax credit measure at a time in the 
subsequent regression analyses. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
To test Hypothesis (1), we first adopt the 
following logit models 
 
   
 
                               (Model 1)  
    
             (Model 2) 
 
,i tPayer  equals to 1 if firmi’s dividend per share 
at Yeart is positive; 0 otherwise. ,i tInst  is the 
percentage of firmi’s stock owned by institutional 
investors at Yeart. Factors related to the probability 
being dividend payer, i.e., size, which is measured by 
market capital, BV/MV ratio, and industry 
classification are used as control variables.  
Based on the hypothesis, the coefficients for 
,i tInst  is expected to be positive signaling a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and a 
firm being a dividend payer.    
To test Hypothesis (2), we examine the 
determinants of former dividend payers and firms 
having never paid dividend as follows. 
    
     
                               (Model 3)   
  
  
                               (Model 4) 
 Based on the hypothesis, we expect to see the 
coefficients for  
,i tInst  to be negative for Neverpaid 
and Formerpayers confirming it is less likely these 
firms would stop paying dividends or having never 
paid dividends when institutional ownership is high.   
To test deferred tax or tax credit and the 
probability of a firm being a dividend payer as in 
Hypothesis (3), we first adopt the following models:  
          
                          (Models 5-8) 
 Where
 
,i tDeftax  is deferred tax or tax credit, 
which is Deferred Tax & Investment Tax Credit, 
Deferred Taxes at income account, Investment Tax 
Credit at income account or Deferred Taxes at balance 
sheet, one tax measure at a time, in models 5-8. Based 
on our hypotheses, the coefficients for
,i tDeftax are 
expected to be positive signaling a positive 
relationship between a firm being a dividend payer 
and institutional tax benefits.   
We subsequently adopt the following multivariate 
models to jointly test the relationship between a 
dividend payer and institutional ownership and 
institutional deferred tax and tax credit. 
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                 (Models 9-12) 
 We expect both coefficients for 
,i tInst  and 
,i tDeftax to be positive signaling a positive 
relationship between the likelihood of dividend payers 
and institutional tax credits when institutional 
ownership is controlled for.   
 
3.3.1 Cross sectional time-series 
regression models  
The following linear unbalanced panel data univariate 
regressions and multivariate regressions are 
conducted to test the direct relationship between 
dividend payments and tax difference as well as 
institutional ownership as in Hypotheses (4) and (5) 
                       
(Model 13) 
                
(Models 14-17) 
     
                                                                           
(Models 18-21) 
,i tDividend  is the dividend per share paid by 
firm i  at year t . The other variables have the same 
definition as before. Similarly, we expect that both 
coefficients for institutional ownership and tax credits 
will be positive. 
  
4. Results 
4.1 Logit regression results 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the logit regressions. At 
column (1) where the dependent variable is current 
payers and the independent variable is
,i tInst , the 
coefficient for 
,i tInst  is positive (1.263) and 
statistically significant at the one percent level as 
expected. This indicates Payers are more likely to 
associate with institutional ownership. Interestingly, 
different from what we expected to see at column (2), 
when the dependent variable is newly listed firms that 
pay dividends (Newpayers), the coefficient is negative 
(-1.166) and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
By examining the data, we find that the average 
institutional ownership for newly listed firms is much 
lower than the others. Thus, as Fama and French 
(2000) suggested, we believe that the dividend 
payment decision for newly listed firms is more likely 
to be determined by the characteristics of firms that 
have never paid dividends. In column (3) when the 
dependent variable is Formerpayer, the coefficient for 
,i tInst  is negative (-1.984) and the coefficient is 
again statistically significant. The negative correlation 
is consistent with hypothesis (3). It can be interpreted 
as firms with larger institutional ownership are less 
likely to stop paying dividends. Similarly, when the 
dependent variable is Neverpaid as in column (4), the 
significant negative estimate (-1.166) implies that 
firms with higher proportions of institutional investors 
are less likely to be firms that have never paid 
dividends. These results support the theory that firms 
decide to pay dividends to attract relatively more 
institutions, and institutions have a relative advantage 
in detecting high firm quality and in ensuring that 
firms are well managed. 
Columns 5-8 in Table 3 provide the estimation 
results of the deferred tax or tax credit effect on the 
probability of being a dividend payer.  As we can see 
from the table, the coefficients for all four deferred 
tax measures are positive (0.005, 0.02, 0.001 and 
0.005 respectively) and statistically significant at the 
one percent level.  
The last four columns (9-12) in Table 3 report 
multivariate regression results. The coefficients for 
,i tInst
 
 in the four models are 2.218, 1.931 and 2.364 
and 2.197 respectively while the corresponding 
,i tDeftax coefficients are 0.004, 0.01, 0.00, and 
0.004 respectively. These results are consistent with 
those from the univariate regressions, confirming the 
implication of the Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) 
theory that tax differences between institutions and 
retail investors are significant determinants of 
dividend payments. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
4.2 Cross sectional time-series 
regression results  
 
The regression results are reported in Table 4.  The 
first 5 columns report the univariate results and 
columns 6-9 report the multivariate results. The 
results from both univariate regressions and the 
multivariate regressions are consistent hence we only 
discuss the multivariate results.  Consistent with the 
results in Table 3, coefficients for institutional 
ownership and tax credits are positive and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. For example, the 
coefficient for 
,i tInst  is 0.272, 0.267, 0.250 and 
0.272 respectively when the tax credit measures are 
Deferred Tax & Investment Tax Credit, Deferred 
Taxes at income account, Investment Tax Credit at 
income account and Deferred Taxes at balance sheet 
respectively. These results are consistent with 
Hypotheses (3) and (4) suggesting that the dividend 
amount is positively correlated with institutional 
ownership and deferred tax and investment tax 
credits. Note that in the regressions, all year dummies 
are included but the results are not reported for space 
efficiency.  Further, we also look at the same analysis 
in a dynamic setting, that is, we look at how changes 
of institutional ownership and deferred tax and tax 
credits effect changes in dividend payments. The 
results are positive as expected, they are, however, not 
significant. Hence we are not reporting them here.  
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Table 4 about here 
 
5. Summary 
 
This paper examines the link between dividend policy 
and institutional ownership within the context of the 
dividend theory of Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000). 
Using dividend data from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
merged database and institutional ownership data 
from the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 13f 
Institutional Holdings from 1980-2002, excluding all 
financial and utilities firms, we first examine the 
linkage between dividend policy and institutional 
ownership using a logit regression, then examine the 
relationship between the level of dividend payment 
and institutional ownership and institutional deferred 
tax or tax credit using cross-section time series data.  
The results from our regressions provide support for 
the hypothesis that dividend payers are more 
associated with institutional investors than non-
payers. That is, the firms with higher institutional 
ownership are more likely to pay and continue to pay 
dividends.  Further, we find that tax credit or deferred 
taxes significantly contribute to the initiation of the 
dividend and the dividend amount. These results 
support the predictions in Allen, Bernardo and Welch 
(2000). 
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Appendices 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Current Dividend Payer (yes=1 no=0) 68,476 0.47 0.50 
     New Dividend Payer (yes=1 no=0) 68,562 0.03 0.17 
Not Current Dividend Payer  (yes=1 no=0) 68,476 0.53 0.50 
     Former Dividend Payer (yes=1 no=0) 68,562 0.08 0.27 
     Never Paid Dividend (yes=1 no=0) 68,562 0.45 0.50 
Dividend Per Share ($) 68,476 0.35 0.89 
Total Dividend (million$) 68,476 27.69 175.29 
Retained Earnings (million$) 13,270 165.68 852.50 
Deferred Tax & Invest Tax Credit (million$) 55,469 62.41 412.09 
Deferred Tax (Income Account) (million$) 52,013 1.47 88.93 
Deferred Taxes (Balance Sheet) (million$) 53,622 62.95 411.57 
Investment Tax Credit (Income Acct) (million$) 33,094 1.52 15.45 
Annual Institutional Ownership 68,562 0.27 0.24 
Market Cap Value (million$) 68,530 1,576.84 9,775.24 
Book to Market Ratio 62,211 0.51 4.76 
Data are from two sources - the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database and the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 13f Institutional 
Holdings. Sample period is 1980-2002.  Table 1 gives the summary statistics of the key variables in the sample. 
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Table 2. Correlation Table 
 
  
Institutional 
Ownership 
Dividend per 
Share 
Deferred Tax & 
Invest Tax 
Credit 
Deferred Tax 
(Income 
Account) 
Invest. Tax 
Credit 
(Income 
Acct) 
Deferred 
Taxes 
(Balance 
Sheet) 
Market 
Cap Value 
Book to 
Market 
Ratio 
Institutional Ownership 1        
Dividend per Share 0.0802 1       
Deferred Tax & Invest Tax 
Credit 0.0904 0.185 1      
Deferred Tax (Income Account) 0.0363 0.0432 0.2326 1     
Investment Tax Credit (Income 
Acct) 0.041 0.174 0.2312 0.0252 1    
Deferred Taxes (Balance Sheet) 0.0914 0.174 0.9967 0.2319 0.1955 1   
Market Cap Value 0.092 0.1029 0.5115 0.1176 0.1089 0.5165 1  
Book to Market Ratio -0.0381 0.0082 -0.0088 0.0024 0.0054 -0.0093 -0.0228 1 
         
Data are from two sources - the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database and the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 13f Institutional 
Holdings. Sample period is 1980-2002.  Table 2 reports the correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable 
(Dividend) in the subsequent regressions. Notice that the correlations among the different taxes are high, so we use one tax variable at a time 
in the subsequent regression analysis. 
 
Table 3. The Effect of Institutional Ownership and Tax Credits on the Probability of Dividend Payment 
 
  
Logit Model: The dependant variable equals 1 if the company is the current dividend payer for model 1 and model 5-
12, otherwise 0. The dependant variable equals 1 if the company is a former dividend payer in model 2, never paid 
dividend in model 3 and new dividend payer in model 4, otherwise 0. 
 
Independent Variables 
Current 
Dividen
d Payer 
New 
Dividen
d Payer 
Former 
Dividend 
Payer 
Never 
Paid 
Dividen
d 
Current 
Dividend 
Payer 
Current 
Dividend 
Payer 
Current 
Dividend 
Payer 
Current 
Dividend 
Payer 
Current 
Dividend 
Payer 
Current 
Dividend 
Payer 
Current 
Dividend 
Payer 
Current 
Dividend 
Payer 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Institutional Ownership 1.263 -1.427 -1.984 -1.166     2.218 1.931 2.364 2.197 
  
(0.038)*
** 
(0.172)*
** 
(0.080)**
* 
(0.037)*
** 
    
(0.045)**
* 
(0.057)**
* 
(0.046)**
* 
(0.046)**
* 
Deferred Tax & Invest 
Tax Credit     0.005    0.004    
(DATA35)     
(0.000)**
* 
   
(0.000)**
* 
   
Investment Tax Credit      0.020    0.010   
Table 3 continued 
 (Income Acct, 
DATA51) 
     
(0.004)**
* 
   
(0.003)**
* 
  
Deferred Tax       0.001    0.000  
 (Income Account, 
DATA50 ) 
      
(0.000)**
* 
   
(0.000)**
* 
 
Deferred Taxes         0.005    0.004 
(Balance Sheet, 
DATA74) 
       
(0.000)**
* 
   
(0.000)**
* 
Market Cap Value 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000)*
** (0.000)* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)*
** 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
Book to Market Ratio 0.257 0.157 -0.003 -0.099 0.109 0.053 0.110 0.116 0.185 0.112 0.193 0.191 
  
(0.013)*
** 
(0.030)*
** (0.002) 
(0.011)*
** 
(0.012)**
* 
(0.014)**
* 
(0.013)**
* 
(0.013)**
* 
(0.014)**
* 
(0.017)**
* 
(0.015)**
* 
(0.015)**
* 
Industry Code Number -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.000)*
** 
(0.000)*
** 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)*
** 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
(0.000)**
* 
Constant 0.939 1.067 -1.236 -1.195 1.737 2.073 1.876 1.697 1.399 1.775 1.485 1.362 
  
(0.069)*
** 
(0.108)*
** 
(0.075)**
* 
(0.069)*
** 
(0.072)**
* 
(0.085)**
* 
(0.075)**
* 
(0.072)**
* 
(0.073)**
* 
(0.086)**
* 
(0.076)**
* 
(0.074)**
* 
Observations 62140 62211 62211 62211 55170 32899 51755 53335 55170 32899 51755 53335 
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Table 4. Linear Effect of Institutional Ownership and Tax on Dividend Payment 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Models 
Current Dividend Payer 
 
13             14               15              16             17                18               19             20              21 
Institutional Ownership 0.214     0.272 0.250 0.267 0.272 
  (0.021)***     (0.021)*** (0.024)*** (0.020)*** (0.022)*** 
Deferred Tax & Invest Tax Credit  0.000    0.000    
   (0.000)***    (0.000)***    
Investment Tax Credit (Income Acct)   0.003    0.003   
    (0.000)***    (0.000)***   
Deferred Tax (Income Account)    0.000    0.000  
     (0.000)**    (0.000)** 
Deferred Taxes (Balance Sheet)     0.000    0.000 
      (0.000)***    (0.000)*** 
Market Cap Value 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Book to Market Ratio 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry Code Number -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 0.536 0.601 0.688 0.583 0.596 0.574 0.657 0.559 0.569 
  (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** 
Observations 62140 55170 32899 51755 53335 55170 32899 51755 53335 
Standard errors in parentheses.* indicates significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%  
Data are from two sources - the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database and the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 13f Institutional 
Holdings. Sample period is 1980-2002.  All year dummies are included but chosen not to report them for space efficiency. 
 
Figure 1A. Percentage of Dividend Paying Firms vs. Non-Dividend Paying Firms 1980-2002
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Figure 1B. Percentage of Newly Listed Firms That Are Dividend Payers 1980-2002
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Figure 1C.  Percen tage o f Firms of Fo rmerly  Hav ing  Paid  v s. Firms Having  Never Paid  1980-2002
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Figure 2. Institutional Ownership and Average Annual Dividend Amount 1980-2002
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